[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
issue should be resolved by peaceful means, Japan Rogachev, pleasant travels in Japan.
consistently states, even at the ministerial level, that the Rogachev. Permit me to say a few words. We are
Korean side has no juridical basis for ruling these islands. finishing the meeting of the working group on a peace
Your phrase about a flexible approach misses the treaty. I want once again to emphasize that the Soviet
mark. We would like the Soviet side to understand: from Union is conducting an honest, principled, open policy in
the political point of view there can not be the same all areas of the world, in relation to all countries and, in
approach to the northern territories which before the war particular, in relation to its close neighbor, Japan. At the
were inhabited by 16 thousand Japanese, and which have end of last year, following the conception of new political
an area of five thousand square kilometers, and to the thinking, we took on an active role in improving our
Takeshima islands, which are uninhabited. If the Soviet relations with Japan. After the meeting of our Minister of
Union considers it possible to adhere to the aforemen- Foreign Affairs with Japanese leaders in December of last
tioned approach, it thereby ignores political realities and year there were hopes that perhaps a new stage in the
the political significance of the issue of the northern history of Soviet-Japanese relations was beginning. An
territories, on the one side, and of the issue of the understanding was reached between the ministers of
Takeshima islands, on the other hand. foreign affairs on the creation of a working mechanism to
210 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10
prepare a summit meeting and a working group on a peace make their own assessment of the scale of this benefit.
treaty, and it was approved by the Prime Minister of Japan [Ed. note: The May 1989 Uno-Gorbachev meeting is
and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side honestly covered in A.S. Cherniaev s memoirs, excerpted elsewhere
fulfilled the obligations it had taken upon itself, seriously in this Bulletin.]
preparing for the meeting of the working group in Tokyo I want to assure you that the Soviet side will make
and made a statement on all of the issues which constitute efforts toward normalizing relations with Japan. I agree
the concept (poniatie) of a peace treaty. We counted on that as a result of the meetings we have begun to under-
the same approach from the Japanese side. stand each other s positions better and in this sense have
Unfortunately, I am obliged to state that from you we deepened our mutual understanding.
heard only a statement on the so-called territorial issue. Deep differences remain on the issue which you call
I am left with the impression that you are avoiding the use territorial. We will await your thoughts on the subject of
of the term peace treaty. We also did not hear what the our statement today after you study it.
Japanese conception is, [that is] your understanding of a On behalf of my comrades I want to thank you
peace treaty. We consider that this will be a serious study, sincerely for your attention, for your hospitality, for
and hope that the Japanese side will make its answer at the organizing our trip around the country, and finally, for
next session of the working group. creating [good] work conditions. And on the subject of
Of course, there still remains the meeting with Mr. when I will meet with you, Mr. Kuriyama, we will agree
Uno. This is the high point of our entire work here, I mean separately. I mean the next meeting of the working group
both the consultations and the meeting of the working on the peace treaty.
group. So far we have nothing about which to inform Kuriyama. I agree.
Moscow, aside from the fact that we heard the old Japa-
[Source: Obtained by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Translated by
nese theses on the territorial issue. The question arises:
Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]
how has the preparation for the meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs benefited, let alone a summit meeting? It
Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë%
seems to me that our Japanese colleagues themselves will
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPERS
#1 Chen Jian, The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China s Entry into the Korean War
#2 P.J. Simmons, Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw
#3 James Richter, Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum
#4 Vladislav M. Zubok, Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The Small Committee of Information, 1952-53
#5 Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose : New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61
#6 Vladislav M. Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-62)
#7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two
Reports
#8 Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From
Russian Archives
#9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947:
Two Reports [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl wyciskamy.pev.pl
issue should be resolved by peaceful means, Japan Rogachev, pleasant travels in Japan.
consistently states, even at the ministerial level, that the Rogachev. Permit me to say a few words. We are
Korean side has no juridical basis for ruling these islands. finishing the meeting of the working group on a peace
Your phrase about a flexible approach misses the treaty. I want once again to emphasize that the Soviet
mark. We would like the Soviet side to understand: from Union is conducting an honest, principled, open policy in
the political point of view there can not be the same all areas of the world, in relation to all countries and, in
approach to the northern territories which before the war particular, in relation to its close neighbor, Japan. At the
were inhabited by 16 thousand Japanese, and which have end of last year, following the conception of new political
an area of five thousand square kilometers, and to the thinking, we took on an active role in improving our
Takeshima islands, which are uninhabited. If the Soviet relations with Japan. After the meeting of our Minister of
Union considers it possible to adhere to the aforemen- Foreign Affairs with Japanese leaders in December of last
tioned approach, it thereby ignores political realities and year there were hopes that perhaps a new stage in the
the political significance of the issue of the northern history of Soviet-Japanese relations was beginning. An
territories, on the one side, and of the issue of the understanding was reached between the ministers of
Takeshima islands, on the other hand. foreign affairs on the creation of a working mechanism to
210 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10
prepare a summit meeting and a working group on a peace make their own assessment of the scale of this benefit.
treaty, and it was approved by the Prime Minister of Japan [Ed. note: The May 1989 Uno-Gorbachev meeting is
and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side honestly covered in A.S. Cherniaev s memoirs, excerpted elsewhere
fulfilled the obligations it had taken upon itself, seriously in this Bulletin.]
preparing for the meeting of the working group in Tokyo I want to assure you that the Soviet side will make
and made a statement on all of the issues which constitute efforts toward normalizing relations with Japan. I agree
the concept (poniatie) of a peace treaty. We counted on that as a result of the meetings we have begun to under-
the same approach from the Japanese side. stand each other s positions better and in this sense have
Unfortunately, I am obliged to state that from you we deepened our mutual understanding.
heard only a statement on the so-called territorial issue. Deep differences remain on the issue which you call
I am left with the impression that you are avoiding the use territorial. We will await your thoughts on the subject of
of the term peace treaty. We also did not hear what the our statement today after you study it.
Japanese conception is, [that is] your understanding of a On behalf of my comrades I want to thank you
peace treaty. We consider that this will be a serious study, sincerely for your attention, for your hospitality, for
and hope that the Japanese side will make its answer at the organizing our trip around the country, and finally, for
next session of the working group. creating [good] work conditions. And on the subject of
Of course, there still remains the meeting with Mr. when I will meet with you, Mr. Kuriyama, we will agree
Uno. This is the high point of our entire work here, I mean separately. I mean the next meeting of the working group
both the consultations and the meeting of the working on the peace treaty.
group. So far we have nothing about which to inform Kuriyama. I agree.
Moscow, aside from the fact that we heard the old Japa-
[Source: Obtained by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Translated by
nese theses on the territorial issue. The question arises:
Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]
how has the preparation for the meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs benefited, let alone a summit meeting? It
Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë% Ë%
seems to me that our Japanese colleagues themselves will
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPERS
#1 Chen Jian, The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China s Entry into the Korean War
#2 P.J. Simmons, Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw
#3 James Richter, Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum
#4 Vladislav M. Zubok, Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The Small Committee of Information, 1952-53
#5 Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose : New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61
#6 Vladislav M. Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-62)
#7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two
Reports
#8 Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From
Russian Archives
#9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947:
Two Reports [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]